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RIGHTS OF BAILOR AGAINST A THIRD PARTY FOR AN INJURY WHEN
BAILEE HAD CHATTEL IN POSSESSIOI4 AND CONTRIBUTED
TO THE INJURY.
The recent case of Gilson v. Bessemer & L. E. R. Co., 75 Ad.
Rep. 195, is a very interesting case on the question of what
rights the bailor of a chattel has against a third party when his
bailee by negligence contributes to the negligent injury of the
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third party. There are two views on this question, one imputing
the negligence of a bailee to his bailor and the other allowing the
bailor to recover. The latter view was adhered to by the court
in this case. The view taken by the court was that "Where the
owner of a livery stable lets out a horse and buggy and the horse
is killed at a grade crossing by the joint negligence of the bailee
and the railroad company, the negligence of the bailee is not to
be imputed to the owner of the horse, so as to prevent him from
recovering from the railroad company."
The court then shows what a bailment is and that the relation
between a livery stable keeper and hirer of horse and buggy is
that of bailor and bailee. In arriving at the conclusion that the
negligence of the bailee is not to be imputed to the bailor, the
court seems to rely largely on recent text books as Edwards on
Bailments, Van Zile on Bailments and Thompson on Negligence,
also citing the case of Bard v. Yohn, 26 Pa. 486. These text
books argue that the bailee is not a servant or under control of
the bailor and because he does not stand in the place of the
bailor his negligence cannot be imputed to the bailor. The bailor
and bailee are independent parties and hence the doctrine of re-
spondant superior cannot be involved.
There are not many cases on the subject and a review of them
shows that the courts have taken both sides on this question.
The court in Hirliliy v. Smith, 1 i6 Mass. 265, in deciding the
right of a third party against a bailor because of bailee's fault
laid it down as law that "The owner of a horse and carriage is
not liable for an injury caused by the negligent driving of a
borrower, to a third person if they were not being used at the
time in the owner's business." By applying this principle the
bailor could not sue the third party because the bailee was not his
agent.
A remarkably strong case supporting this doctrine is that of
New Jersey Electric Ry. Co. v. New York L. E. & W. Ry. Co.,
61 N. J. L. 287; 43 L. R. A. 849. The court made a very ex-
haustive review of the cases in point and held in conclusion that
"The negligence of the bailee or his servants or agents is not im-
putable to the bailor, and will not prevent recovery."
In this case the plaintiff let out to another railroad company
a locomotive and cars. The defendant was a street railway com-
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pany whose tracks crossed those of the second railway company.
The jury by a special verdict found that negligence on the part
of both parties had contributed to a collision at the crossing point
of the roads. In this collision the rented locomotive and cars
were injured. After showing that where there was no negligence
on part of the bailee the bailor could recover against a third
party the court went on to say: "The general property remains
in the bailor and the bailee only has a special interest for the
express or implied objects of the bailment. Under these general
rules now well established as governing the contract of bailment,
it would be entirely too artificial to say that no right of action
existed by the bailor against a third party as a wrongdoer for in-
jury by negligence or otherwise, to the chattel which was the
subject of bailment. . . . It would seem, upon reason, that there
could exist no objection to the joint liability of the wrongdoer
and the bailee when the joint negligent act of both caused the
injury."
The distinction between the relation of bailor and bailee and
that of master and servant was then pointed out. No agency
existed in this case to bring it under the agency doctrine of im-
putable negligence.
Analagous cases were then taken by the court. Cases were
cited showing that negligence of one passenger is not imputable
to the railway company, which is a common carrier of all passen-
gers. The court said here, "There must exist concurring negli-
gence in some respect in the railway company." The Court also
laid stress on the fact that the owner of a reversionary interest of
chattel has the same right of action in respect to injury thereto
as in the case of real property. Halsey v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co.,
45 N. J. L. 26; Potts v. Clarke, 2o N. J. L. 536. Continuig, the
court distinguishes between the bailment of a common carrier
which is an insurer of goods entering into a particular contract of
bailment, and the bailment of chattels per line.
In conclusion the court said, "The bailee was bound to use rea-
sonable care and diligence in the preservation of the property
from injury. The defendant in the operation of the electric car
was bound to exercise reasonable care in avoiding injury to the "
property of which the plaintiff was the owner. It would seem
that the intervention of the negligence of the bailee could not
shield. the defendant from injury caused by its own negligence.
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Both might have been selected as joint tort feasors, or the action
could be maintained against either. . . . Each is liable upon its
own negligence and the negligence of the bailee is not imputable
to the plaintiff as a shield to the defendant against recovery.
The case of Bard v. Yohn; 26 Pa.. 486, cited in the case under
comment accords with this view.
An interesting analogous case is that of Boehm v. Bethlehem, 4
Pa. Supr. Ct. 385. It was held that the owner of a building was
not prevented from recovering from a borough for damages from
an overflow caused by the negligent obstruction of a sewer be-
cause his tenants had thrown some of the obstructions into the
sewer.
The opposing view is very strongly supported. In the case
of Sv alnss Co. v. Vicksburg L. & P. Ry. Co., i53 Fed. Rep.
774, it was held that contributory negligence of a compress com-
pany which had possession of the cotton as bailee at the time it
was destroyed is imputable to the owner and contributed a de-
fense. Here the insurance company was subrogated to the rights
of the owners of the cotton and because of the negligence being
imputed to owner could not recover. The bailor in this case had
no knowledge of the negligence of the compressing company
which left cotton on a platform where sparks from passing en-
gines could set it on fire. Hence acquiescence could be no reason
for imputing negligence to the bailor. Somewhat analogous is
the imputing of the negligence of a consignor to his consignee.
McCarthy v. Louisville Ry. Co., iO2 Ala. 193.
Another case of cotton being injured in the hands of a bailee
is that of Ry. Co. v. Tankersley, 63 Tex. 57. Here the court in
speaking of the rights of the plaintiff said: "For if the cotton
was stored with C. C. Wilson & Co. then they were the bailors of
the plaintiff. And if it was in an exposed and dangerous place
and this was known to Wilson & Co., or might have been known
by 'slight care and attention' on their part and that cotton was
destroyed by reason of being so exposed, then the negligence in
this regard would be imputable to appellee and would constitute
a defense to his action against appellant."
A similar line of reasoning is followed in the case of gratuitous
bailee. The case of Ry. Co. v. SiMS, 77 Miss. 325, is an example
of this. There the court was speaking of the rights of bailee
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and bailor against third parties, and said: "Whatever entitles
to a recovery entitles either bailor or bailee to such recovery.
E converso whatever forbids a recovery to the bailee will also
defeat the bailor's action.
Another case of gratuitous bailee is that of Welty v. Indian-
apolis & Vincennes Ry. Co., Io5 Ind. 55. It was decided by
this case that "Where the borrower of a horse while intoxicated,
rides the animal along a highway to a railroad crossing, and, there
being no fence or cattle guard as required by statute, the horse
turns and proceeds upon the track until killed by an approach-
ing train the railway company is not liable to the owner in an
action based upon the statute requiring such companies to keep
their tracks securely fenced." The case of Forbes Township v.
King, 84 Pa. St. 23o, follows this view, holding that "The owner
of a horse lent without line is responsible for the negligence of
the borrower, and if the negligence of the latter contributed to
an accident whereby the horse was killed, the-owner cannot re-
cover.
Thus it will be seen that there is strong authority on both
sides. Those cases supporting the case under comment hold that
there is no relation of master and servant and because the bailee
is not an agent his negligence cannot be imputed to bailor or
doctrine of respondent superior invoked.
The other side argues that the bailor gives up for a certain
time and under certain conditions his right to a chattel. The
bailee takes the chattel not as an agent, but as an independent
party acting for himself. The bailor after a time acquires the
right to possession of his chattel. He"finds that it is injured and
wishes to recover against a third party who committed the in-
jury. But the courts hold his substitute has by his negligence
contributed to the accident and is prevented from recovering.
Hence the bailor cannot get any better rights than the party he
clothed with rights of possession.
The supporting cases appear to assume that the only way negli-
gence can be imputed is by the master and servant doctrine. But
it seems as if there were a distinction between an agent and a
substitute and that the doctrine of agent and principal need not
be used to uphold the view of the courts opposed to the view of
the case under comment.
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As stated before, recent text books favor the doctrine of the case
under comment. Otherwise opinion seems evenly divided. The
bailor at one time had no rights against third parties. However,
the right of bringing trover, replevin and trespass against third
parties for injury to his chattel in the hands of bailee have been
gradually acquired and this case seems to be in line with the in-
creasing rights of the bailee to sue.
UNREASONABLE DISCRIMINATION IN THE EXERCISE OF THE POLICE
POWER.
It has generally been agreed by all the courts that it is much
easier to perceive and realize the existence and the sources of the
police power than to mark its limitations or prescribe limits to its
exercise. Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 85. It is
always easier, says Chief Justice Waite, to determine whether a
particular case comes within the general scope of the power than
to give an abstract definition of the general scope of the power
itself which will be in all respects accurate. Stone v. Mississippi,
ioi U. S. 814.
But in the recent case of People ex. rel. Duryea v. Wilber, 9o
N. E. I I4O, the New York Court of Appeals did not find it easy
to determine whether that particular case came within the scope
of the police power, since the decision was only reached by the
close vote of four to three justices that an amendment to the
Greater New York Charter, requiring that all public dancing
academies and schools where a charge is made for teaching
dancing shall procure a license authorizing the business to be con-
ducted at the place named, was unconstitutional. This case was
one of considerable public interest as the statute in question had
been framed and passed through the urgent efforts of the Com-
mittee on Amusement and Vacation Resources of Working Girls
as a measure to mitigate the evils of the cheap dance hall. In
addition to the requirement of a license at a cost of $5o per year,
the law laid down various other rules governing the conduct of
such dancing academies, but only the resorts where ddncing was
taught for a consideration had to secure the license.
This classification the majority of the justides held was wholly
an arbitrary and unjust discrimination, since it was based on a
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ground that was without reason, "for there is nothing in the fact
of teaching as distinguished from dancing without a teacher that
has any injurious effect upon or relation to the morals, health, or
good order of the comnmunity." Nor was the act intended as a
revenue measure as the fees were all to go for the payment of
the inspectors' salaries. The three dissenting justices felt that the
wisdom of such legislation was no concern of the courts, and
since the law only required a discrimination based on the police
power to rest on a plausible reason, and there were reasons ad-
vanced which would at least support an argument in this case,
they held it a constitutional exercise of the police power as
promoting the public safety, health, and decency.
As a general rule, laws to be valid as police regulations must be
necessary to the health, morals, order or safety of the community
and no law prohibiting that which is harmless in itself or com-
manding that to be done which does not tend to promote the
health, safety, or welfare of society, will be gustained, since it
would be an unauthorized exercise of the power. EX parte
Whitewell, 98 Cal. 73. While the police power confided to the
legislature is very extensive and in its exercise a very wide dis-
cretion as to what is needful or proper for that purpose is nec-
essarily given to it, so that any business, occupation, rights, fran-
chises or privileges becoming obnoxious can be regulated for the
public welfare even to suppression, still this power is not above
the Constitution, but rather begins only where the Constitution
ends. New Orleans Water Works Co. v. St. Tammany Water
Works Co., 14 Fed. 194; Wright v. Hart, 182 N. Y. 330.
As a general proposition it may be stated that it is in the prov-
ince of the law making power to determine whether the exigencies
exist calling into exercise the power, and the exercise of its discre-
tion in this respect is not the subject of judicial review. What
are the subjects of its exercise and reasonable regulations is
clearly established to be a judicial question. T. W. & W. R. W.
Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37. The determination of the
legislature as to what is a proper exercise of the power is not
final or conclusive, but is subject to the scrutiny of the courts
and a statute to be upheld must have some relation to the ends
sought by the police power and the liberties of the people and
the rights of property must not be unnecessarily invaded. If it
violates no express commands of the Constitution and tends in a
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degree that is perceptible and- clear towards the preservation 
of
the lives, the health, the morals, or the welfare of the community,
and is not passed ostensibly in favor of the promotion of 
some
distinct and totally different purpose, it comes within the 
juris-
diction of the legislature and the courts will sustain it. People 
v.
Gilison, io9 N. Y. 389; Wright v. Hart, supra; Chicago B. & 
Q.
R. Co. v. State, 47 Neb. 549.
But the most frequent source ofunconstitutionality is not 
in the
subject sought to be regulated, but in the existence of arbitrary
distinctions as in the principal case. The rule requiring equality
of treatment and protectiol is that such acts shall operate 
in their
requirements with substantial equality to all. It is not sufficient
that a classification has been enacted under the police legislation
of the State, but it must appear that it is based upon some reason-
able ground which has a proper relation to the attempted 
classifi-
cation and is not a mere arbitrary selection. Russel on 
Police
Power, p. 74. But such equality is not denied where the 
law
operates alike upon all persons and property similarly 
situated.
Wallston v. Nervin, 128 U. S. 578. Accordingly the Supreme
Court has held that a municipal ordinance prohibiting washing
and ironing in public laundries and washhouses within 
defined
territorial limits, from ten o'clock at night till six in 
the morn-
ing, was a proper police regulation. Class legislation, 
discrim-
inating against some and favoring others, is prohibited; but 
legis-
lation which is carrying out a public purpose and is limited 
in its
application, if within the sphere of its operations it affects 
alike all
persons similarly situated, is not unconstitutional. Barbier 
v. Con-
izolly, 113 U. S. 27.
In the case of People ex rel Farrington v. Mensching, 
187
N. Y. 8, decided in i9o7, the Court held a statute unconstitutional
which imposed a tax of two cents on each share of 
corporate
stock of one hundred dollars of face value or fraction 
thereof.
The tax was thus measured by the number of shares regardless
of their actual value. All corporate shares were placed in one
class, but all members of the class were not treated alike, 
the
statute bearing heavily on some and lightly on others: The I899
anti-department store law of Missouri was an interesting 
ex-
ample of the application of the rule of the principal case. 
In
that case a statute of Missouri provided that in cities of fifty
thousand population, certain enumerated kinds of goods should
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not be sold in the same building under a unit of management
without paying a tax of from $3oo to $8oo fixed by the Board of
Commissioners for each city and which was to be uniform only
in the same city. This was held to create a purely arbitrary dis-
tinction and to be void. State ex ref Wyatt v. Ashbrook, x54
Mo. 375.
Statutes regulating the right to practice medicine or other pro-
fessions but allowing the right to all who have the qualifications
prescribed, do not deny equal protection. People v. Phippen,
70 Mich. 6; State v. Green, 112 Ind. 462. But if such a statute
discriminates between persons engaged in the same profession
or against citizens of other States, then equal protection is denied,
as in State v. Pennoyer, 65 N. H. 113, where a statute was held
unconstitutional which required one of two classes of physicians
differing only in-respect to the residence to be subject to the ex-
pense of obtaining a license from which the other party was ex-
empt.
Where the act requiring any plumber before engaging in the
business to take an examination and obtain a license, but per-
mitted all members of a firm to pursue the business where one
only had procured such a license and all the members of a
corporation to pursue it where the manager only had procured
such license, it was held that the act did not operate equally upon
all of a class pursuing the calling under like circumstances and
was invalid. State v. Gardiner, 58 Ohio St. 599. If a law is im-
partial on its face, yet is applied and is so administered as to
operate a denial of equal justice, it may be declared unconstitu-
Jional. Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 373. But the possi-
bility of maladministration is not sufficient ground. Williams v.
Mississippi. 170 U. S. 213.
From the principles laid down and the illustrations given of
their application, it would appear, however, that the New York
Court of Appeals has properly applied the law in the principal
case.
MALICIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS.
Although the Courts, both in England and in America, have
very generally held the rule, since Stevenson v. Newham (1853),
13 C. B. 285, that bad motive by itself is no tort, and that an act
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lawful in itself is not converted by a malicious or bad motive 
into
an unlawful act so as to make the doer of the act liable to 
a civil
action, still the contrary opinion persists in presenting itself 
be-
fore the Courts.
The recent case of Arnold v. Moffitt, 75 Atl. (R. I.) 502, has
applied this doctrine, settled so clearly in the famous case 
of
Allen v. Flood (1898), App. Cas. i, to an interesting and some-
what novel set of circumstances. It will be found upon examina-
tion that practically all the cases regarding malicious interference
with business are those where the elements of conspiracy or breach
of contract enter. In this case neither is present. The plaintiff,
a contractor for electrical work, alleged ten instances where 
he
claimed to have been delayed, hindered or discriminated against
by the defendant, an inspector for the Providence Insurance Asso-
ciation. The defendant was charged with refusing and neglecting
to make inspections within reasonable times, and at other times
with maliciously requiring the plaintiff to make changes which
were not required of other contractors. None of the ccunts
were held to give a legal cause of action. Nevertheless, the
plaintiff appeared to proceed on the theory that although the
defendant may not have done any illegal act yet he was liable 
to
the plaintiff by reason of the malicious character of his acts.
But the Court held that as there was no proof of any illegal act
on the part of the defendant, it was of no consequence that 
it
might be made to appear that the defendant was actuated by
malicious motives in what he did as inspector, and so gave judg-
ment for the defendant.
The question whether malice is an essential element of the
cause of action in cases of interference with business, and in fact
what malice means in this connection, has been the subject of
very lengthy discussion in the cases which have arisen in England
and this country since the modem labor problem has become so
acute. In this respect, the principal case is in an entirely different
field, and yet the principles governing it are not different in any
way from those laid down in the labor cases.
There were certain expressions used by the judges in the English
cases of Lumnley v. Gye, 2 El. & B1. 216; Bowen s,. Hall (ig8i),
L. R. & 6 Q. B. Div. 333; and Temperton v. Russell (893), i
Q. B. 715, which might readily be taken as supporting the view
that malice is the gist of the action, and Lord Coleridge (after-
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Wards Lord Chief Justice of England) based his dissent to the
first two of the above cited cases on this point. However, in all
of these cases the defendant had been guilty of an unlawful act in
procuring the breach of a contract so.that there was a tangible
expression of malicious motive in a definite illegal act com-
mitted by the defendant in all three cases.
But in Allen v. Flood, supra, the judges expressly denied these
implications, and in Quinn v. Leathen (i9oi), App. Cas. 495, a
still more recent case, Lord Mac Naghten, in speaking of Lunzley
v. Gye, supra, said: "I have no hesitation in saying that I think
that decision was right-not on the ground, of malicious intention
-that was not, I think, the gist of the action, but on the ground
that the violation of a legal right committed knowingly is a cause
of action, and that it is a cause of action to interfere with con-
tractual relations recognized by law, if there is no sufficient
justification for the interference."
It.is a settled rule in England now, as laid down by Lord Wat-
son in Allen v. Flood, supra, that, "Although the rule may be
otherwise with regard to crimes, the law of England does not
take into account motive as constituting an element of civil
wrong. Any invasion of the civil rights of another person is in
itself a legal wrong, carrying with it liability to repair, its necessary
or natural consequences, in so far as these are injurious to the
person whose right is infringed, whether the motive which
prompted it be good, bad, or indifferent. But the existence of a
bad motive in the case of an act not in itself illegal will not con-
vert the act into a civil wrong for which reparation is due." The
-same case quotes the definition of malice of Judge Bayley in
Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B. & C. 247. "Malice in common accept-
ance of the term means ill will against a person. But in the
legal sense it means a wrongful act done intentionally without
just cause or excuse." This has often been approved, although
it eliminates motive and includes only "wr'ongful" acts intention-
ally done.
In this Country the same general doctrine has been followed.
"Malicious motives make a bad act worse, btit they cannot make
that wrong which in its own essence is lawful. As long as a man
keeps himself within the law by doing no act which violates it,
we must leave his motive to Him who searches the heart." Jen-
kins v. Fowler, 24 Pa. St. 3o8.
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Malice has been said to exist when defendant's acts were done
without right or justifiable cause with the unlawful purpose to
cause damage or loss to the plaintiff. Walker v. Cronin, io 7
Mass. 562.
In view, however, of the many unsettled points regarding the
rights of trade and labor, the Massachusetts Courts have felt it
wise to leave a possible qualification to the general doctrine, that
bad motive by itself can never be a tort. "It is said also that
where one has the lawful right to do a thing, the motive by which
he is actuated is immaterial. If the meaning of this and similar
expressions is that where a person has the lawful right to do a
thing, irrespective of his motive, this motive is immaterial, the
proposition is a mere truism. If, however, the meaning is that
where a person, if actuated by one kind of motive, has a lawful
right to do a thing, the act is lawful when done under any con-
ceivable motive, or that an act lawful under one set of circum-
stances, is therefore lawful under every conceivable set of cir-
cumstances, the first proposition does not commend itself to us
as either legally or logically sound. In many cases the lawfulness
of an act which causes damage to another may depend upon
whether the act is for justifiable cause, and this justification may
be found sometimes in the motive alone and sometimes in the
circumstances and motive combined." Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass.
492.
In the United States, malicious interference with business,
when it takes the form of interference with a contract between
two parties, has called forth a variety of diverse opinion. The
weight of opinion, including the United States Supreme Court,
holds with Lumley v. Gye, and Bowen v. Hall, supra, that if one
maliciously interferes between two parties and induces one of
them to break that contract to the injury of the other, the party
injured can maintain an action against the wrongdoer. Angle v.
Chicago, etc. R. Co., 151 U. S. I.
Some Courts go so far as to hold that the action lies even
though the contract would not have been enforceable against the
party who was induced to break it. Perkins v. Pendleton, go Me.
166. And it has been held actionable even to wrongfully deter
others from entering into contracts or business dealings with a
party. May v. Wood, 172 Mass. II. Contra, Guethler v. Alt-
man, 26 Ind. App. 587.
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On the other hand, some decisions disagree with Lumley v.
Gye, supra, and hold that an action commonly lies only for entic-
ing a servant away from a master, or for procuring by fraud,
threats or violence, the breach of a contract by a party thereto,
to the damage of the other party. Boulier v. Macauley, 91 Ky.
135; Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121; Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal.
578.
I
